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ABSTRACT 
 
The rice yield and real agricultural wage in Bangladesh increased by 3.8 percent and 2.1 
percent per annum respectively from 2000 to 2010. Over the same period, the share of hired labor 
in agriculture decreased from 19.4 percent to 15.5 percent. A focus of this paper is to understand 
if the observed changes in wages and hired labor are in part due to agricultural productivity growth 
as reflected in increasing rice yield.  To estimate the effects of agricultural productivity, we take 
advantage of an Upazila (subdistrict) level panel data set from Bangladesh and exploit variations 
in rainfall across Upazilas and over time.  We find that a positive rainfall shock has a significant 
positive effect on crop yields, wages, per capita household expenditure and labor supplied to 
market activities (including own farming). The effect on hired labor is, in contrast, negative and 
statistically significant.  In a standard neoclassical model, higher agricultural productivity affects 
wages and hired labor through labor demand; a rightward (leftward) shift increases (reduces) both 
wages and the amount of hired labor.  The finding of a negative hired labor response to agricultural 
productivity growth with a higher wage thus appears puzzling.  We develop a model where 
heterogeneity in labor supply response due to differences in productivity in home goods production 
can lead to a decline in hired labor when agricultural productivity increases, even though the 
equilibrium wage increases. Since the poor in rural areas depend disproportionately on wage labor, 
a decline in hired labor may be interpreted by some as evidence of adverse effects on poverty and 
inequality. The theoretical analysis, however, shows that the poor benefit from agricultural 
productivity growth even when the labor supply responses result in a decline in hired labor. 
     
Key Words: Agricultural Productivity, Home Production, Market Work, Wage, Hired Labor, 
Labor Supply Response, Poverty 
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(1) Introduction
The eects of agricultural productivity growth on rural poverty have been a topic of
lively debate during the past couple of decades among development economists (see, among
others, Datt and Ravallion (1998), Foster and Rosenzweig (2004), Datt and Ravallion
(2011)).1 While Datt and Ravallion(1998) nd agricultural yield growth to be an important
factor behind poverty reduction in India between 1960 and 1990, Foster and Rosenzweig
(2004) report that agricultural productivity growth also increased inequality. In a standard
model of the rural labor market, changes in agricultural productivity aect employment
and wages by shifting the demand for labor. An early concern in the literature on the
green revolution (Grin (1974)) emphasized possible adoption of labor-saving technology
such as tractors along with new varieties of rice and wheat, thus suggesting that the labor
demand curve would shift to the left. The alternative view, substantiated by accumulated
evidence over 1970s and 1980s, is that productivity growth due to high-yielding varieties
of rice and wheat in fact increased the demand for labor. These alternative views yield
sharp predictions about the eects of agricultural productivity growth: both wages and
employment (and hired labor) increase (rightward demand shift) or decrease (leftward
demand shift) in tandem. In this perspective, the eects of productivity growth on wages
are sucient to discriminate between the alternative views, which may explain the almost
exclusive focus on wages in most of the literature, and the consequent neglect of any
potential eects on labor supply and hired labor.
In Bangladesh, the rice yield and real agricultural wage increased by 3.8 and 2.1 percent
annually between 2000 and 2010, respectively. The share of hired labor in agriculture
decreased from 19.4 percent in 2000 to 15.5 percent in 2010. To the extent the observed
changes in wages and hired labor are partly due to agricultural productivity growth (higher
rice yield), the existing explanations that focus exclusively on the demand for labor fail
to explain the evidence. In this paper, we make two contributions. First, we develop a
more complete model where heterogeneity in the labor supply response to the wage plays
1For recent literature surveys, see World Development Report (2008), and Schneider and Gugerty (2011).
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an important role, and show that agricultural productivity growth may cause wages, and
hired labor employment to move in the opposite directions. Second, we provide credible
estimates of the eects of agricultural productivity growth on wages, hired labor and labor
allocation between home goods production and market oriented activities. The evidence
shows that higher rice yields in Bangladesh increase wages in agriculture, but reduces the
amount of hired labor, thus contradicting the widely held demand shift views where they
move in the same direction. The results are, however, consistent with the model developed
in this paper which brings into focus the role played by heterogeneity in labor supply
response.
Since the poor in rural areas depend disproportionately on wage labor, a decline in hired
labor can be interpreted by some as evidence that agricultural productivity growth has had
adverse eects on the poorest households in Bangladesh. Our theoretical and empirical
analysis, however, shows that such an interpretation would be incorrect, as the decline in
hired labor reects the fact that households have more productive use of their labor in own
farming. We also provide evidence that there is a positive eect of agricultural productivity
growth on household per capita consumption, which strengthens the conclusion that the
households benet from agricultural productivity growth even though the prevalence of
hired labor declines.
The focus on heterogeneous labor supply response is important in the context of devel-
oping countries where wage employment in rural labor markets is often limited (Rosenzweig
(1988)), and a substantial amount of `surplus labor' in the form of underemployed and un-
employed family labor exists.2 In many developing countries, poor households are poor
because most of their labor endowment is employed in low-productivity home-based non-
marketed activities such as foraging, child care, and food preparation, not because they are
(openly) unemployed.3 When low-productivity home production is prevalent, the poverty
2For instance, Rosenzweig and Foster (2010) nd that 20 percent of the rural labor force in India is
`surplus'.
3The concept of home production we use is essentially that of Becker (1965) (for a recent discussion, see
Heckman (2015)). One might argue that the absence of open unemployment in our model may overstate
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impact of agricultural productivity may depend primarily on how the allocation of labor
from home production to own farming and wage labor changes in response to agricul-
tural productivity growth.4 The analysis in this paper highlights the potential pitfalls in
drawing policy recommendations from piecemeal analysis that focuses solely on the labor
market outcomes. Little or no response of wages to agricultural productivity growth does
not necessarily imply no eects on poverty, since a substantial increase in labor supply to
more productive agricultural activity can lead to signicant reduction in poverty even at a
constant wage rate.
To estimate the eects of agricultural productivity, we take advantage of an Upazila
(subdistrict) level panel data set from Bangladesh, and exploit variation in rainfall across
Upazilas and over time. We implement an approach that focuses on the eects of rainfall
shocks in reduced form regressions on the outcome variables (wage, employment in own
farming and in hired labor, hours worked for market oriented activities, and per capita
consumption) and also on the measure of agricultural productivity (crop yield). The ev-
idence from the reduced form regressions is sucient to test the theoretical predictions,
which relies on the fact that spatial and temporal variation in rainfall can be interpreted
as shifts in the production function, because rainfall is a major determinant of crop yield
in Bangladesh (Sarkar et. al. (2012); Bhowmik and Costa (2012)).
We also provide an instrumental variables interpretation of our estimates, using rainfall
variation across Upazilas and over time (relative to the mean) as an instrument for crop
yield (rice yield). The regressions include Upazila xed eects to remove the time invariant
unobserved spatial heterogeneity, and year xed eects to wipe out the common price
(international) and other macroeconomic shocks. To be as clinical as possible, we allow
the benets of agricultural productivity growth. However, it is easy to check that a higher demand for
labor due to the Green Revolution results in more hired labor and lower unemployment, ceteris paribus, in
an eciency wage model of unemployment (both nutrition-productivity (Mirrlees (1974), Stiglitz (1976))
and moral hazard (Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984)) variants). Thus a model with unemployment does not alter
the conclusions regarding the welfare eects.
4This is more so in African countries where wage employment in agriculture and non-agriculture in
rural areas is very limited (see Davis, Guiseppe and Zezza (2014)). The reallocation of labor in response
to agricultural productivity growth in the African case is between home production and own farming.
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for time-varying direct impacts of these factors by including interactions of a ood-prone
area dummy and travel time to metropolitan cities (Dhaka and Chittagong) with the time
trend. We include an extensive set of control variables to account for time-varying direct
eects of infrastructure and other area characteristics.5 Empirical estimation issues and
the strategy to deal with them are discussed in detail in Section 2.6
The regression estimates reported later show that a positive rainfall shock has a sig-
nicant (at the 1 percent level) positive eect on wages; a 1 percent increase in rainfall
(relative to the mean) increases wages by about 0.46 percent. The eect on hired labor is,
in contrast, negative and statistically signicant at the 5 percent level; a 1 percent increase
in rainfall reduces hired labor by 0.73 percent. The negative response of hired labor is not
due to an increase in nonfarm employment; total agricultural employment remains nearly
unchanged in response to a positive rainfall shock. Our results also indicate that households
increase hours supplied to the market-oriented activities in response to a positive rainfall
shock, thus providing additional evidence of reallocation of labor from home production.
We include own farming and wage labor in `market-oriented activities'. When interpreted
as instrumental variables estimates of the eects of productivity increase, the estimates
show substantial impact of an increase in rice yield on wages, hired labor, and labor supply
to the market activities.
We provide an intuitive graphical exposition of the main insight of our theoretical anal-
ysis to explain the apparently puzzling nding of a negative response of hired labor to a
positive agricultural productivity shock. The negative response of hired labor is consistent
with the case where labor reallocation from home production by labor decit households is
stronger than that by labor-surplus households in the initial equilibrium. The recent liter-
ature on the eects of agricultural productivity on rural labor markets mainly focuses on
5The rationale behind the choice of control variables is discussed in Section 2.
6It is worth emphasizing that while the rainfall shocks have been used for identication in a variety of
contexts, agricultural productivity is probably among the most natural contexts where rainfall can provide
reasonable identifying variations (Foster and Rosenzweig (2004), Adhvaryu, Chari and Sharma (2013),
Bruckner and Ciccone (2011)).
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labor reallocation between agriculture and non-agricultural sectors while taking labor sup-
ply as xed (Foster and Rosenzweig, 2004). There is also a long tradition of examining the
economy-wide impacts of agricultural productivity growth using Computable General Equi-
librium (CGE) models (for a review of the literature, see Schneider and Gugerty(2011)).
Some of the CGE-based analyses consider the implications of surplus labor (e.g., Dorosh
and Thurlow (2014)), but they do not explicitly model the labor market interactions that
can give rise to surplus labor endogenously. In spirit, our analysis is perhaps closest to
that of Fontana and Wood (2000). Fontana and Wood (2000) simulated the eects of trade
policy changes (e.g., rise in import price of food, incentives provided to manufacturing,
etc.) on female and male allocation of time among reproduction (child bearing and rear-
ing), leisure and market activities, and on rural wages, using a Social Accounting Matrix
(SAM). In response to an increase in imported food price, Fontana and Wood (2000) nd
that both women and men reallocate their labor from home production (reproduction and
leisure) to market work { primarily in agriculture { and rural wages increase in the new
equilibrium. In contrast with Fontana and Wood (2000), we make a distinction within
employment in market activities between hired labor and self-employment in agriculture,
and our focus is on the eects of improvements in agricultural productivity.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section (2) develops a model of the rural
economy that focuses on the implications of labor supply heterogeneity. discusses The
empirical strategy is discussed in section (3), followed by a description of data in Section
(4). The empirical results as well as an intuitive diagrammatic explanation of the ndings
are discussed in section 5. The paper concludes in the nal section.
(2) A Model of the Eects of Agricultural Productivity Growth on Rural
Labor Market
We construct a simple model of a farm economy consisting of two (types of) households
(h and k). Each household owns A units of agricultural land, but they dier in terms of
5
the endowment of labor, household h (L0h) with more labor than household k (L
0
k < L
0
h):
7
The households produce two goods: food (agriculture) and a home good. The concept
of home good we use is essentially that of Becker (1965) and consists of services that are
primarily produced and consumed within the household. The archetypal home production
includes food (meal preparation), children, and housing (Becker (1965), Heckman (2015),
Fontana and Wood(2000)). The households also dier in a second dimension; they have
access to dierent technologies for home good production.
Households consume three goods/services: a home good (d), and two market goods
(food (f), a nonfarm good (m)). Both food and nonfarm goods are assumed to be interna-
tionally traded, and we take the food commodity as the numeraire. The assumption that
both food and nonfarm goods are tradable implies that their prices are pinned down at the
international market, which is useful for abstracting away from the demand side factors,
and focusing only on the supply side responses.8 Assuming identical preferences, the utility
function for households in the village is the following: U = u(cf ; cm)+u(cd) == c
'
f c
1 '
m +cd;
where cf is consumption of food, cm is consumption of the nonfarm good. The budget con-
straint can be stated as: Y F = cf + Pmcm + P dCd; where Pm is the price of the nonfarm
good, P d is the shadow price of the home good, and the agricultural good is the numeraire,
i.e., Pf = 1, and Y
F = wL0 + rA is the full income, with w denoting the village wage rate
and r the rental rate for land.
(2.1) Production of the Home Good and Labor Supply to Market Work
The production function for the home good is assumed to display decreasing returns to
scale: Qdi = l
i
di for i = h; k and 0 < i < 1; where ldi is the amount of labor used in home
good production by household i. The curvature of the home good production function thus
diers across households, which turns out to be critical for the theoretical results below.
7A richer model, where households dier in land endowment and skilled labor, generates the same set
of qualitative conclusions. We discuss this issue in the online appendix.
8The simplifying assumption that nonfarm goods are traded would apply to manufacturing. Many
nonfarm services activities are non-traded and would respond to a change in the village income. Please see
the discussion in the appendix.
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The household's optimization problem can be simplied by imposing the condition that
home good production and consumption be the same for a household in equilibrium. The
optimization problem can be stated as
MaxCf ;Cm;ldiUi = c
'
f c
1 '
m + cdi = c
'
f c
1 '
m + l
i
di (1)
3 w  L0i   ldi+ rA = cf + Pmcm (2)
To derive the budget constraint in equation (2), subtract wldi from both sides of the full
income budget constraint : wL0   wldi + rA = cf + Pmcm + P diCdi   wldi: Now budget
constraint (2) follows from noting that the shadow price of labor is w for all households,
which along with the equality of the full budget constraint, implies that P diCdi = wldi.
9
For notational parsimony, denote the money income as Yi = w (L
0
i   ldi) + rA.
The rst order conditions can be derived as:
li 1di   w = 0 (3)
'c' 1f c
1 '
m    = 0 (4)
(1  ')c'f c 'm   Pm = 0 (5)
where  is the Lagrange multiplier associated with budget constraint (2) above. Using
equations (4) and (5) along with the budget constraint in equation (2), we derive optimal
consumption for market goods as: cf = 'Yi; and cm =
(1 ')Yi
Pm
.
Without a solution for optimal labor allocation to home goods, we do not know the
value of market income Yi. But we can use equation (4) to solve for  as:
 = 'c' 1f c
1 '
m = '('Y )
' 1[
(1  ')Y
Pm
]1 ' = ''(1  ')1 'P' 1m =
^

The marginal condition determining the optimal use of labor in home production can be
9The nonsatiation property of the utility function ensures that the full income budget constraint is
satised as equality.
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expressed as:
il
i 1
di =
^
w for i = h; k (6)
Equation (6) along with the budget constraint for the home good P diCdi = wldi can be used
to solve for the household-specic shadow price of the home good as P di =
i
^

:
From equation (6), the amount of labor allocated to home production varies inversely
with the wage. The supply of labor for market work can be written as:
Li(w) = L
0
i   ldi = L0i  
 
i
^
w
!(1 i) 1
; with Lwi =
@Li
@w
> 0 for i = h; k (7)
The supply of labor to market oriented activities (as opposed to home production) by each
household depends on agricultural productivity indirectly through its eects on wage. The
larger is the value of i, the larger is the magnitude of supply response of labor for market
work.10 An exogeneous rise in wage draws labor out of home production and into market
work.11
The model setup generates an upward sloping labor supply function for market work.
As noted earlier, the model is general enough that the home good can also be interpreted as
leisure, but avoids the awkward possibility of a backward bending supply curve of labor in
a low-income village economy.12 An alternative model is where there is (open) unemploy-
ment, and labor supply responses occur primarily at the extensive margin. The formulation
adopted here is attractive, because explicit unemployment is not high in rural areas of de-
veloping countries, and poor people are poor not because they are unemployed (consuming
leisure), but because they work long hours in extremely low-productivity activities such as
foraging. Those low-productivity non-market economic activities are modeled as home pro-
10Note that if we also add heterogeneity in the demand function so that i 6= j , the main results of the
paper go through.
11Heterogeneity in  not only implies that the curvature is dierent, but also that the productivity
(output for a given level of labor) diers, except for the case when ldi = 1.
12It is not realistic to expect that people would like to consume more `leisure' when managing three
meals a day is a challenge.
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duction in our model.13 Our denition of labor supply to market work corresponds to the
traditional denition of total labor supply that includes self-employment on own farm as
well. The distinction between market work and home production in our case is that market
work consists of all work whose output can be and is usually transacted in the market. For
instance, labor spent on producing rice that is consumed at home is considered as market
work since rice is widely traded in the market. Home production, in contrast, consists of
services (e.g. meal preparation, child care or simply leisure) which are consumed at home
and not usually sold in the market.
The equilibrium in the farm economy is characterized by land and labor market clearing
and an external balance condition (export food and import nonfarm good at world prices).
By Walras law, we can ignore the external balance condition. Wages are thus determined
by the labor market clearing condition, and the rental rate for land is determined by the
total supply of land.
(2.2) Labor Demand for Market Work in Agriculture
For workers in the farm economy, there are three employment options: (i) home pro-
duction, (i) family-owned farm, (iii) other farms.14 Households produce food using land
and labor with the same constant returns (CRS) technology. The food output by each
household can be described as: Qfi = F (A; lfi) = 
 
Al1 fi

for i = h; k; where  rep-
resents total factor productivity in food production, A is the endowment of land which is
assumed to be xed, and lfi is the labor used in food production by household i. The
demand for labor in agriculture does not vary across households given that they face the
13The model outlined here does not allow for the possibility of labor market rigidity that may arise from
socio-cultural practices (e.g., purdah restriction), which in turn lock household workers (especially female)
into low-productive home production activities. Welfare gain from moving workers from home production
to market work would be much higher in the presence of such rigidities. However, overall conclusions of
the model regarding home versus market work are valid under that alternative scenario as well.
14Note that we do not include production of the nonfarm good in the model. For an extended model
that focuses on production of nonfarm goods and allows for heterogeneity in skill and nontradability of the
nonfarm good, please see Foster and Rosenzweig (2004), and Emran and Shilpi (2014).
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same technology and prices, and labor demand for each household can be derived as:
lfh = lfk = 
1
A[
(1  )
w
]
1
 (8)
Total labor demand in farming is then:
lf = lfh + lfk = 2(1  )41 1 ( 1
w
)
1
 (9)
Where 41 = A[1  ] 1  .
(2.3) Eects on Wage
Setting labor demand equal to labor supply, the equilibrium condition in the labor
market can be expressed as:
lf = lfh + lfk = 242 1 ( 1
w
)
1
 = Lh(w) + Lk(w) (10)
where 2 = 41(1  ):
Proposition 1:Given the assumptions that food is produced under CRS technology using
land and labor, and the home good is produced under decreasing returns to scale (DRS)
technology using labor alone, a positive productivity shock in agriculture (i.e., a higher )
results in an increase in the wage rate; the higher is the response of labor supply to the
wage, the lower is the change in the equilibrium wage rate.
(2.4) Response of Hired Labor
Since the labor endowment of household k is smaller than that of household h, household
h is a net seller of labor and household k is a net buyer of labor. Let lw be the labor hired
for farming work (by household k), which can be written as:
10
lw = 2
1
 [
1
w
]
1
   Lk(w)
= 2
1
 [
1
w
]
1
  
24L0k  
 
k
^
w
!(1 k) 135 (11)
Proposition 2: In a rural economy where there is heterogeneity in households' en-
dowment of labor, the eects of agricultural productivity on hired labor depend on the labor
supply responses of the labor-surplus and labor-decit households. Assuming constant re-
turns to scale in agriculture and decreasing returns to labor in home production, we have
the following result:
When the labor supply response of labor-decit households with respect to a change in
the wage is larger than that of labor surplus households (k > h), an increase in agricultural
productivity leads to a decrease in hired labor.
The intuition behind the results in proposition (2) reects the fact that a higher agricul-
tural productivity increases returns to own-farming, and induces both types of households
to substitute away from home production, which is subject to decreasing returns to labor.
Proposition (2) shows that when Lwk is quite large, the induced supply response of decit
households could reduce hired labor.15 It is important to emphasize that although the
amount of hired labor can decrease in response to a productivity increase in agriculture,
the wage response is always positive. In the above framework, if there are no adjustments
at the margin of home production (which includes leisure), and thus Lwh = L
w
k = 0, the
impact of an increase in agricultural productivity on hired labor is zero. The response
of hired labor to agricultural productivity can thus be a fruitful metric for gauging the
importance of home production and labor supply response. This is especially important
for empirical analysis because the household surveys in developing countries usually lack
15For a low value of supply response of the decit household, substitution between home production and
own farming is smaller, leading to a higher wage and more hired labor.
11
reliable information on home production activities.
Although the response of hired labor to an agricultural productivity shock is ambiguous
a priori, and thus can lead to misleading conclusions about the poverty impact of agricul-
tural productivity changes, the response of total labor devoted to market work is positive
under the plausible assumption that h > 0; k > 0. In the empirical analysis, we thus
look at both hired labor and total labor devoted to market production as opposed to home
production.
Proposition 3: Regardless of its impact on hired labor, an increase in agricultural
productivity increases total income in a village. The increase in village income is higher,
the higher is the labor supply response with respect to wage (i.e., larger values of k and
h).
Proof: See the appendix.
In this model there are thus two sources of income gains following an increase in agri-
cultural productivity: a reallocation of labor from home production to agriculture, and a
higher productivity in agricultural activity. In other words, the income and poverty im-
pacts of agricultural productivity will be larger when households can increase their labor
supply to market work, which does not necessarily imply an increase in hired labor through
the market. This result is important because it underscores the importance of looking at
the eects on both price (wage) and quantity (total labor supplied to the market, not only
hired labor) adjustments to understand the eects of an agricultural productivity increase
on the poor.
(3) Empirical Framework
To estimate the eects of agricultural productivity growth on wages, labor allocation
across own farming and hired labor, and household consumption, we construct a subdistrict
(Upazila) level panel data set using three rounds of Household Income and Expenditure
Surveys (HIESs). To examine the impact of agricultural productivity on employment and
12
wage, we use the following regression specication:
Oijt = j + t + jt +1Zjt + "ijt (12)
where i indexes the outcome variables (e.g., the share of employment in an activity, wages,
per capita household consumption expenditure, etc.), j denotes the Upazila, Oijt is the
outcome variable, and j and t denote the eects of Upazila- and year-specic factors,
respectively. Our focus variable is jt measures agricultural productivity, Zjt is a vector of
Upazila characteristics, and "ijt is the error term. Estimation of the impact of agricultural
productivity on employment and wages presents some diculties. Unobserved Upazila char-
acteristics that are correlated with both wage/employment and agricultural productivity
may create spurious correlations, and provide biased estimates of the eects of agricul-
tural productivity change. For example, consider the heterogeneity in access to markets
due to geographic location; Upazilas that are closer to the metropolitan cities (Dhaka and
Chittagong) will have higher agricultural productivity (higher demand, and cheaper and
more reliable supply of inputs such as fertilizer and pesticide) and higher wages (because
of employment opportunities in the cities). Thus when we regress wages on crop yield, we
might nd a positive eect, both driven primarily by dierences in access to markets across
dierent Upazila. In general, it is not possible to control for all such potential confounding
factors in a regression specication, and thus OLS results may be misleading. An impor-
tant advantage in our application is that we construct a panel data set, which allows us to
use Upazila xed eects (j in regression equation (1) above) to remove the eects of all
time invariant but unobserved Upazila characteristics. The year xed eects (t) control
for any macroeconomic and international shocks (including commodity price shocks) that
may have aected both agricultural productivity and the outcomes of interest.16
In the empirical analysis, we follow a two-step procedure. First, a reduced form regres-
16The year xed eects will control for any general equilibrium eect common to all households (e.g.,
prices).
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sion of an outcome variable (for example, wage) on the instrument, and second, a reduced
form regression of the productivity measure (yield per acre) on rainfall are estimated. This
two-step procedure has some important advantages in our application. First, the reduced
form estimates of the eects of rainfall on the outcome variables, such as wages and em-
ployment in agriculture, are of interest on their own; for example, they provide us evidence
on the potential benets of increased irrigation investment on the rural economy. Second,
when the focus is on the eects of productivity increase in agriculture, one can interpret the
rainfall dierences as variation in the parameter . Finally, given the evidence that rainfall
signicantly increases rice yield, the reduced form estimates of rainfall on wages, employ-
ment, and consumption are useful, because they provide evidence on the existence of causal
eects of higher crop yield that are not subject to weak instrument bias (Chernozhukov
and Hansen(2008)).17 We estimate the following reduced form regressions:
Oijt = j + t + 1Rjt +1Zjt + "ijt (13)
Vjt = j + t + 2Rjt +2Zjt + jt (14)
where Rjt is the annual rainfall in Upazila j and Vjt is the measure of productivity. In the
empirical estimation, the rainfall variable is expressed in logarithm. Thus our empirical
model with Upazila and year xed eects provides estimates of the impact of rainfall shock
on the growth of the outcome variables. Rainfall shock for an Upazila is dened as the
deviation of rainfall in any year from its mean over all the years. A positive coecient of
rainfall (2 > 0), for instance in the yield regression, means that an increase in rainfall over
its mean level (a positive rain shock) increases rice yield.
We implement a xed eects estimation procedure that removes the Upazila-level un-
observed xed factors by de-meaning all variables in the regression. Such demeaning may,
however, exacerbate the attenuation bias, as it is likely to magnify any measurement error
17We emphasize again that the main results of this paper do not depend on the exclusion restriction on
rainfall imposed in the IV interpretation; what we need is that rainfall aects productivity signicantly.
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in the measure of agricultural productivity (Griliches (1963)). We use an instrumental
variable approach to remedy the attenuation bias and the possible biases due to any other
omitted variables not taken care of by the Upazila and year xed eects. Following a
large and mature literature, agricultural productivity is measured by crop yield (Foster
and Rosenzweig (2004), Adhvaryu, Chari and Sharma (2013)). More specically, we use
rice yield per acre, as rice is the predominant subsistence and cash crop in Bangladesh. We
exploit rainfall variations as an instrument for rice yield. Rainfall is found to aect agricul-
tural yields in both developed and developing countries, and hence is widely considered a
credible instrument for agricultural yields (Foster and Rosenzweig (2004), Adhvaryu, Chari
and Sharma (2013), Rajan and Ramcharan (2010), Bruckner (2012)).18
To ensure that rainfall primarily captures variation in agricultural productivity, we
include an appropriate set of controls in Zjt: One may argue that the agricultural labor
market will be inuenced by the eects of rainfall on nonfarm activities. For example,
construction employment may rise with higher rainfall if rainfall leads to ooding and
destruction of the infrastructure, which results in higher repair and reconstruction work. In
so far as agricultural labor is also employable in construction work, this will have an impact
on agricultural wages. Flooding and destruction may also lead to a negative correlation
between rainfall and nonfarm labor demand if it disrupts production activities. The positive
and negative eects of the nonfarm sector on the agricultural labor market may, in some
cases, largely oset each other. One can use a oodplain dummy to control for such eects.
Note that the negative eects of ood caused by heavy rainfall, especially, on prices and
wages, will depend on the location of an Upazila, because access to urban markets provides
a cushion against such shocks. Travel time to urban markets can be used to account for
such heterogeneity. Travel time also captures the spatial variations in the prices of tradable
goods, because it is a reliable proxy for the transport and other marketing costs. Since
18Rainfall has been used as an instrument in a variety of contexts ranging from civil war to foreign
aid ow in the recent economic literature. While there are limitations to relying on rainfall variation for
identifying information in many applications, rainfall variations are probably the most natural candidate
for exogeneous variations in agricultural productivity, especially in developing countries.
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travel time and the oodplain dummy are time-invariant (or can change only very slowly
over years), they are subsumed by Upazila xed eects. As a conservative strategy, we allow
for time-varying eects of these two variables, and include their interactions with the time
trend in the regressions. We also include the proportion of households in a Upazila with
electricity as a control.19 Availability of electricity may foster nonfarm activities that are
less susceptible to the weather, and may have a dierential eect on part of the agricultural
labor market through substitutability of labor. To capture changes in labor endowment,
we control for Upazila population and the proportion of active labor force with secondary or
above education (human capital). We also control for Upazila population in 1991 (initial
condition) interacted with the time trend. It is, however, important to appreciate that
it is a conservative specication, because by controlling for variations in labor endowment
across Upazilas and over time, we also deny the possibility that the agricultural productivity
changes aect the population in a village.
A nal issue for the empirical specication is that rainfall is expected to have a signi-
cant eect on rice yield only if the Upazila is predominantly rural in its economic activity.
We thus exclude Upazilas located in two main metropolitan areas from our sample. In
addition, we control for the share of urban households in total households in the Upazila.
(4) Data
For the empirical analysis, we combine dierent data sources to dene a Upazila (sub-
district) level panel data set covering the period 2000 to 2009/2010. Our main data source
for the outcome variables (wage, employment in dierent activities, and household con-
sumption expenditure) is three rounds of the Household Income and Expenditure Surveys
(HIESs), available for the survey years of 2000, 2005, and 2010. The HIESs are based on
a nationally representative sample of households.20 These surveys are conducted primarily
for the estimation of poverty incidence and thus provide reliable information on house-
19Our empirical results are robust to controls for agglomeration economies such as the share of an area
in total industry employment in 1991.
20The sample sizes for the HIESs are 7,440 in 2000, 10,080 in 2005, and 12,240 in 2010.
16
hold economic activities, per capita household expenditure, and regional price deators.
Upazila-level data on the outcome and explanatory variables are generated from the HIESs
using appropriate population weights. 21
Productivity growth in agriculture is measured by the growth in crop yield. The pre-
dominant crop in Bangladesh is rice/paddy, of which three dierent types (Boro, Aman,
and Aus) are grown.22 The ocial source of agricultural statistics provides yield data at
the district level; unfortunately, there are no estimates at the Upazila level.23 The source
of the yield data used in this paper is the community part of the HIES. We dene rice yield
per acre as the average of yields of Boro, Aman and Aus rice. The Upazila (subdistrict)
level yields are the average over the villages surveyed within an Upazila. Since the num-
ber of villages within an Upazila are limited, the estimated yield may involve signicant
measurement error. We compare the yield growth estimates from HIES aggregated to the
district level to the corresponding estimates from the ocial agricultural statistics. It is
reassuring that they show comparable growth rates during the decade of 2000s. The yield
estimates at the Upazila (subdistrict) level used in this paper thus are useful as a measure
of productivity.
Rainfall data are drawn from Bandyopadhyay and Skouas (2012). The original data
on rainfall come from the Climate Research Unit (CRU) of the University of East Anglia.
The CRU reported estimates of monthly rainfall for most of the world at the half degree
resolution from 1902 to 2009. The CRU estimation combines weather station data with
21The HIES data are collected over a year to cover all of the agricultural seasons. However, the ocially
released data do not identify the dates when the data were collected. Thus, we cannot distinguish between
the agricultural seasons. The rice yield data are the average of Boro and Aman. Focusing only on Aman
crop reduces the sample size substantially. The yields of Boro and Aman crops correlate rather strongly
and positively. The HIESs do not have enough information on the winter crops, such as wheat, oilseeds,
and pulses. This is, however, not a concern for the paper, as rice is the most widely grown main crop in
Bangladesh.
22The high-yielding variety of Boro rice now accounts for more than half of rice production (56%). Aman
is the next important crop, accounting for 44% of rice production. Yields of both of these varieties are
much higher than that of Aus.
23These data are actually reported at the old (and much larger) district level { there are about 20 old
districts. With the newly created districts, there are now 64 districts in Bangladesh. The source of these
data are Statistical Yearbooks, published by the Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics.
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other information to arrive at the estimates.24 To estimate the subdistrict (Upazila/thana)
level rainfall from the CRU data, Bandyopadhyay and Skouas (2012) use area weighted
averages.25 Travel times to metropolitan cities are computed using GIS software and the
road network from the mid-1990s. Data on ood prone areas are drawn from the Bangladesh
Water Board database. All population variables are drawn from the population censuses.
Over the years, several larger Upazilas were split to form new Upazilas, thus increasing
the total number of Upazilas from 486 in 1990, to 507 in 2000, to 543 in 2010. We used
Upazila maps to identify the borders of Upazilas over time, and matched all Upazilas
in 2000 and 2010 to 1990 Upazilas. The Upazila-level panel is dened using the 1990
Upazila boundaries. The number of Upazilas in the sample used for econometric analysis
is, however, smaller (355 Upazilas with data for more than one year), as we drop the
Upazilas located in the two largest metropolitan areas (Dhaka and Chittagong).
Table 1 provides the summary statistics for the Upazilas over the years. Consistent
with the secular decline in agricultural employment in developing countries discussed in
the literature on structural change, agricultural employment declined from 46 percent in
2000 to 41 percent in 2010. In the farming sector, employment in agricultural daily labor
registered a sharper decline than self-employment. A large proportion of the decline in
agricultural employment has been absorbed in daily (unskilled) labor in the non-agricultural
sector, and a smaller proportion in self-employment. Wages for agricultural labor increased
substantially over time, with the growth of nominal wage equal to 8.9 percent per annum
between 2000 and 2010. The annual average growth in real wage (deated by CPI) was
about 2.1 percent between 2000 and 2010.
24Previous versions of the CRU data were homogenized to reduce variability and provide more accurate
estimation of mean rain at the cost of variability estimation. The version 3.1 data are not homogenized
and thus allow for better variability estimates. The estimates of rainfall near international boundaries are
not less reliable as compared with those in the interior of the country, as the CRU estimation utilizes data
from all the weather stations in the region.
25For example, if an Upazila/thana covers two half degree grid cells for which CRU has rainfall estimates,
then upzila/thana rainfall is estimated as the average rainfall of the two grid-cells, where the weights are
the proportion of the area of the Upazila/thana in each grid-cell. For details, please see Bandyopadhyay
and Skouas(2012).
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The summary statistics in Table 1 also indicate substantial growth in rice yield between
2000 and 2010. Average rice yield per acre grew by an annual rate of 3.8 percent. This
rate is consistent with about 3.7 percent growth in agricultural GDP during the same
time.26 There was a considerable expansion of irrigation during the decade as well -from
60 percent in 2000 to 68 percent in 2010. The estimated standard deviation (Table 1)
shows that there were considerable variations in rice yields across Upazilas. Per capita
household expenditure also exhibited considerable growth, about 3.5 percent per annum.
Strong growth in per capita household expenditure is reected in the substantial decline
in poverty during this time: the incidence of poverty declined from 48.9 percent in 2000 to
31.5 percent in 2010 (World Bank, 2013). Among the other variables, access to electricity
by households improved considerably during the decade (6.3 percent annual growth rate).
There is a decline in the proportion of urban households in our sample over the years, which
reects higher growth of population in metropolitan cities compared with the other urban
areas (rural towns).
(5) Empirical Results
In this section, we present the main empirical results along with some robustness checks.
Wages, per capita expenditure, yield, and rainfall are expressed in logarithms, while hired
agricultural labor is measured as share of total employment. All regressions include Upazila
and year xed eects. All standard errors are corrected for correlation in the error term
within Upazila.
(5.1) Rainfall and Agricultural Productivity
We begin with the evidence on the eects of rainfall variations on agricultural produc-
tivity. Table 2 reports the results from regressions where the log of crop yield is regressed
on the log of rainfall after controlling for Upazila and year xed eects. Column (1) shows
the results when no other explanatory variable is included in the regression. The specica-
tion in column (2) includes the full set of Upazila-level time-varying controls as discussed
26Crop agriculture accounts for 56 percent of agricultural GDP and rice is the single most important
crop in Bangladesh, not only as a subsistence crop, but also as a cash crop.
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in the empirical strategy section (Section 2). All the regressions show statistically and
numerically signicant impact of rainfall on rice yield, which is consistent with a priori
expectations. The estimated coecients imply an increase in yield growth when there is a
positive shock in rainfall over its mean level. This result is consistent with ndings from
a rich body of evidence accumulated by agronomists and crop scientists that shows that
rainfall is a major determinant of yield growth in rice in Bangladesh in the recent decades
(see, for example, Sarkar et. al. (2012)).
Although positive rainfall above the mean increases rice yield, for appropriate inter-
pretation of the results, it is useful to understand whether this reects only the impact
of transitory weather shocks on farming. While the rainfall variations across Upazilas
and over time are expected to aect the yield directly, they are also likely to aect long-
term productivity dierences by inuencing investment in irrigation. The third column
reports the estimated eect of rainfall variations on the area irrigated in a specication
with Upazila xed eects and other controls used in our main regressions. Thus the esti-
mated coecient shows the determinant of irrigation expansion over time. A positive and
statistically signicant coecient on the rainfall variable in this regression indicates that
irrigation expansion over our sample period happened increasingly in areas with relatively
higher rainfall. Historically, irrigation was adopted rst in the drier regions in Bangladesh
resulting in a negative correlation between area irrigated and rainfall in the cross-section
data. However, expansion of irrigated areas over the years happened increasingly in the
high rainfall areas, resulting in a positive correlation { as conrmed by our panel regres-
sion result. Thus the rainfall variable in our panel regressions captures not only transitory
shocks in agriculture, but also the diusion of modern technology in farming over time.
Irrigation may also reduce risk by decreasing the variability of yield, without raising the
average yield, if it does not lead to the adoption of modern rice varieties. The expansion
of irrigation in Bangladesh allowed the adoption of Boro rice whose yields are signicantly
higher than other rice types (Aman and Aus). This is conrmed in the results in Table 2,
which shows that higher rainfall does increase yield signicantly.
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Another issue in the IV interpretation of rainfall is that it may be capturing not only
agricultural productivity shocks, but also the resulting price changes. In a completely
segmented rice market at the Upazila level, a rainfall shock would aect the equilibrium
rice price through income eect. However, rice market is the most developed and spatially
integrated in Bangladesh (see, for example, Golleti, Ahmed and Farid (1995), Hossain and
Verbeke (2010)). In addition, we control for the distances to the main city markets, which
would capture the spatial price dispersion due to transport costs. Moreover, available
evidence on rice markets suggests that the rice price in Bangladesh is indeed pinned down
by the international market.
(5.2) Rainfall, Agricultural Productivity, and Labor Market Outcomes
We start by presenting the regression results for wages for hired daily laborers employed
in farming.27 The result in column (1) in Table 3 shows a statistically signicant and
positive impact of rainfall on agricultural wages. This suggests that the income of unskilled
workers employed in agriculture, who are mostly landless poor, gets a boost from higher
agricultural productivity. The estimated coecient implies that a 1 percent increase in
rainfall increases agricultural wages by 0.46 percent. Column 2 in Table 3 reports the
regression result for hired labor expressed as a proportion of total employment.28 The
evidence in column 2 in Table 3 shows a signicant decline in hired labor in agriculture in
response to a positive rainfall shock: the estimated coecient of log of rainfall deviation
from its average level over the years is -0.124, with t-statistic=2.37. The evidence also
indicates that rainfall has a statistically and numerically signicant positive eect on the
share of own-farming in total employment (column 3 in Table 3) (coecient=0.175 with
t-statistic=3.51). As both shares are expressed in terms of total employment, the net
increase in agriculture's share in total employment is small (0.051). Indeed the coecient
27The number of observations for wage regression is slightly less (341 Upazilas). This is because the wage
data are trimmed by dropping 2.5% of observations from both the upper and lower tails of the distribution.
This trimming is done to correct for coding mistakes. However, such trimming does not aect our results,
if anything, the estimated coecient of rainfall is larger in the untrimmed data.
28The regression results are unaected if the shares are dened in terms of hours worked.
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is not statistically dierent from zero (t-statistic=0.69). This conrms that in response
to a positive shock in agricultural productivity, households reallocate more labor to own
farming, while the overall share of agriculture in total employment remains nearly the same.
(5.3) Understanding the Decline in Hired Labor in Agriculture: Heterogene-
ity in Labor Supply Responses
In a canonical neoclassical model with positively sloped labor supply, an increase in
agricultural productivity shifts the labor demand curve to the right, and thus results in
an increase in agricultural wage and labor employed in agriculture. In an extended model
with production of nonfarm goods, as in Foster and Rosenzweig (2004), and in the open
economy version of the Matsuyama (1999) model, there can be a positive response of hired
labor as well as of own farm labor, because labor is reallocated from the nonfarm sector
through the labor market in response to a positive productivity shock in agriculture. In
the closed economy version of the Matsuyama model (1999), employment in agriculture
could decline as labor moves into manufacturing due to the demand eects of agricultural
productivity growth, yet it cannot explain the dierential responses of own and hired labor
in agriculture found in the empirical analysis above.
We provide a graphical exposition of the insight behind the theoretical results in section
(2) above, which provide a consistent explanation for the empirical results. We start with
the simple case where the dierence in the endowments of land and labor is the only source
of heterogeneity in the model. Given the same production technology for home production,
the labor supply function is upward sloping and symmetric. In other words, the labor
supply curves for households h and k are parallel to each other, but labor supply of h(LSh)
lies to the right of that of k(LSk ), as shown in Figure 1. The demand curve for labor is
downward sloping given the constant returns technology in agricultural production. Since
there is no heterogeneity in land endowments, both households face the same demand curve
for labor (labeled LDk and L
D
h respectively).
29 The equilibrium wage is determined at w,
29The aggregate demand and supply are the summation of demand and supply across households, re-
spectively. While the labor market equilibrium is determined at the intersection of aggregate demand and
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where the aggregate demand and supply curves intersect each other. Household k uses wA
amount of own labor, and AB amount of hired labor on its farm, whereas household h uses
CD on its own farm and sells BC to household k. The amount of hired labor is thus equal
to AB = BC: Note also that at equilibrium, household level demand curve bisects the
horizontal distance between the two labor supply curves and amount of hired labor is equal
to half this distance. This allows us to use household level demand and supply curves to
examine the impacts of an increase in agricultural productivity on wage, own employment
and hired labor in farming.
Now consider a positive shock to agricultural productivity. The increase in agricultural
productivity shifts the household level labor demand curve parallel to the right to LD0j : The
new equilibrium wage rate is determined at the level where new demand curve bisects the
horizontal distance between the two labor supply curves. Since the labor supply curves are
parallel to each other, the distance between them are the same at all dierent wage levels.
In other words, in this symmetric case, the amount of labor hired by household k -which
is labor-decit due to its smaller labor endowment { is still equal to DE = AB which is
in turn equal to EF = BC { the amount supplied by labor surplus household h. In the
new equilibrium, while wage rate and total labor supply increase in response to a positive
shock to agricultural productivity, there is no change in the amount of hired labor.
Consider the case where production technology for home good varies across households.
Specically, we assume that elasticity of home production with respect to labor to be higher
for labor-decit households, resulting in a labor supply curve which is atter, and hence
more elastic. Accordingly, the labor supply curve of household k is atter than that of
household h in Figure 2. Because of the dierence in the slopes of the supply curves, the
horizontal distance between them decreases with an increase in wage rate. As before, the
initial equilibrium wage rate w is determined at the level where demand curve bisects the
horizontal distance between the two supply curves. The hired labor in the equilibrium is
half the distance between A and C. We consider an outward and parallel shift in household
supply curves, we omit those curves from the graph to reduce clutter.
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level demand curve due to productivity increase. At the new equilibrium, the amount of
hired labor is equal to half the distance between D and F . Because labor supply curve LSh
is steeper than LSk ; and new equilibrium wage rate is higher, it follows that DE < AB. In
other words, amount of hired labor decreased in the new equilibrium. In the opposite case,
where LSh is atter than L
S
k , hired labor will increase in response to agricultural productivity
increase.
As shown in Figures 1 and 2, the eects of a positive agricultural productivity shock
depend on the relative shifts in the labor demand (due to productivity growth) and supply
responses of labor surplus and labor-decit households (due to reallocation of labor from
home to market work). An increase in wages due to higher agricultural productivity induces
both decit and surplus households to reallocate labor away from the home production to
the market work, where market work is dened to include all employment in agriculture
(own farming plus hired labor). A decline in hired labor in the face of an increase in
wage can result when the labor-decit households reallocate labor from home production
to the market work at a faster rate than the labor surplus households. Heterogeneity in
the production technologies of home goods between the labor surplus and labor decit
households is thus the key parameter that determines the dierential supply responses
of these households. In addition to explaining the empirical evidence of a decline in hired
labor and an increase in agricultural wages, it is clear from Figures 1 and 2 that an increase
in the agricultural productivity will be associated with an increase in total labor supply
to market work. This prediction is important for discriminating among the competing
hypotheses explaining the decline in hired labor (please see the discussion in section 5.4
below).
(5.4) Alternative Explanations
One can argue that an alternative explanation for the observed eects of agricultural
productivity on hired labor and wages can be oered in terms of heterogeneity in the
technology of market goods instead of heterogeneity in home production. Consider the case
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where there is no labor supply response (e.g., labor supply to market work is xed), but
there is heterogeneity in the technology of the locally produced market good (food) between
the households. Suppose that the labor-decit households use mechanized technology for
rice cultivation so that the productivity shock has no impact on their labor demand. On
the other hand, labor surplus households use more labor intensive technology, and a rise
in agricultural productivity increases their labor demand. Such heterogeneity can lead to
higher wages and lower hired labor as surplus households reallocate labor to own farming
in response to an increase in agricultural productivity, and thus the supply of labor to
the market goes down. It is, however, important to appreciate that if the labor market
response is driven by reallocation within the market activities, then we should not observe
any change in the total labor supply to market work. We emphasize here that there are
good reasons to suspect that such technological heterogeneity in food production cannot
drive the behavior of wages and hired labor in the context of Bangladesh. This is because
the level of mechanization is low in Bangladesh, and there is very little heterogeneity in
the technology used in production of any particular variety of rice across the country.
We provide direct evidence below that a positive rainfall shock induces the households to
increase total labor supply to market activities as measured by hours worked (see column
4 in Table 3).30 The dependent variable here is the log of per capita hours spent on
market work. The results indicate a statistically signicant and positive impact of rainfall
on hours spent on market work. This provides strong support to the conclusion that
households allocate more labor to market activities (as opposed to home production and/or
leisure) in response to agricultural productivity shocks, and that the observed eects of a
higher agricultural productivity on hired labor and wages are not simply due to reallocation
of labor within market oriented activities due to heterogeneity in production technology
30As in most household surveys in developing countries, HIESs have no data on time spent on home
production over the time period considered here (2000-2010). We, however, have data on hours worked on
market activities (including own farming). If the households indeed reallocated labor away from the home
activities to market work, as in the model of section (2), then one would expect a rise in hours devoted to
market work in response to the agricultural productivity shock. From the information on employment and
hours spent on each activity provided by the HIESs, we compute per capita hours spent on market work.
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utilized by households in food (rice) production.
Another possibility is that the income eect of a positive productivity shock increases
the demand for non-traded nonfarm services (Engel curve eect), and the sectoral share of
employment in agriculture declines as a result. A reallocation of labor from agriculture to
nonfarm activities thus may constitute an additional mechanism through which agricultural
productivity growth aects wages and employment in agriculture. The evidence, however,
contradicts such a mechanism. First, the coecients of rainfall in the hired labor and self-
employment regressions nearly cancel each other out, suggesting no signicant change in
agriculture's overall share in employment. A formal test also conrms this; the coecient
of rainfall in total agricultural employment share is positive, but numerically small (0.05),
and statistically insignicant, with a p-value of 0.69. This result shows that the decline
in hired labor in farming is not due to workers leaving agriculture and joining nonfarm
activities. If anything, the labor supply to agriculture increases in response to a positive
productivity shock.
(5.5) Rainfall, Agricultural Productivity, and Poverty Outcomes
The results presented so far show that the daily wage in agriculture increases with a
positive rainfall shock, but there is a decline in hired labor. How does household income
respond to the agricultural productivity shock? While data on wages are available in the
HIES, these surveys unfortunately do not provide any reliable information on income from
self-employment in agriculture and nonfarm activities. Thus, we cannot directly estimate
the impact of a positive agricultural productivity shock on the village income. The surveys,
however, provide good information on household consumption expenditure. In the absence
of information on income from self-employment, we take per capita household expenditure
as an indicator of household income and welfare. The regression results, with log of per
capita expenditure as the dependent variable, are reported in column 5 in Table 3. The
results show a statistically signicant and numerically large positive impact of rainfall shock
on per capita expenditure. The coecient estimate implies that a 1 percent increase in
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rainfall increases per capita expenditure by 0.25 percent.
Since the poor are more likely to be dependent on labor income from the market,
we check how a rainfall shock aects their consumption poverty. The average per capita
expenditure level of households belonging to the bottom 40 percent of the expenditure
distribution in an Upazila is taken as a proxy for the welfare of the poorer section of the
population. The regression results for the log of per capita expenditure of households at
the 40 percent of expenditure distribution are presented in column 6 in Table 3. The
results indicate a statistically signicant positive eect of a rainfall shock on the per capita
expenditure of these poorer households as well. The magnitude of the estimated coecient
(0.265) is slightly larger than that for the full sample (0.252) but they are statistically
indistinguishable from each other. Although the amount of hired labor declines in response
to a rainfall shock, this is not a bad news, as the decline reects the fact that they allocate
labor to more productive own farming, and get higher wages for the labor they still sell to
the market. As a result, the poor benet equally from the higher productivity in agriculture
as the non-poor.
(5.6) Robustness Check
The sample of Upazilas used for the estimation in Table 3 includes all of the Upazilas
outside the two metropolitan cities, and thus some fairly urbanized Upazilas (signicant
proportion of urban households) are also included. A reader may wonder whether our
results remain valid, if we restrict the sample to the predominantly rural Upazilas (less
than half the population in urban municipalities). The results, shown in Table 4, indicate
that the overall results regarding the eects of rainfall shocks on wages, hired labor, market
work, and per capita expenditure hold true in this restricted sample as well. It is reassuring
that the estimates from this robustness check are remarkably close to the results reported
in Table 3.
(5.7) Economic Signicance
The estimated eects of rainfall variations on wages and labor allocation between own
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farming and hired labor in agriculture, as reported in Table 3, provide strong evidence in
favor of a model with signicant labor supply response as households reallocate labor away
from home production. The evidence presented in Table 2 also establishes clear and strong
links between agricultural productivity as measured by rice yield per acre and irrigation
on the one hand, and rainfall variations on the other. It is thus reasonable to interpret the
results on the eects of rainfall variations as capturing largely the eects of agricultural
productivity. As we noted in the empirical strategy section, our results can also be given
an instrumental variables interpretation, which allows us to provide point estimates of the
causal eects of higher agricultural productivity on the agricultural labor market.
Using the coecient estimates in Tables 2 and 3, we compute the IV estimates of the
impact of agricultural productivity on the outcomes of interest.31 The IV estimate for the
eects of agricultural productivity on the wages of daily labor implies that a 1 percent higher
agricultural productivity (crop yield per acre) increases the wage for unskilled agricultural
labor by about 0.93 percent, which is a substantial impact. A 1 percent higher productivity
increases the share of people engaged in own farming by about 1.4 percent, while it reduces
the hired daily labor in agriculture by about 1.5 percent.32 The estimate for per capita
expenditure implies that a 1 percent increase in the agricultural yield increases the per
capita expenditure of an average household by 0.50 percent and of the poorer households by
0.52 percent. The implied causal eects of agricultural productivity growth on agricultural
wages, labor reallocation to own farming and poverty are thus numerically substantial.
(6) Conclusions
This paper provides a theoretical and empirical analysis of the eects of agricultural
productivity on the rural labor market and poverty using an Upazila (subdistrict) level
31The IV estimates are not reported separately, because one can recover them by dividing the reduced
form estimate in the outcome equation by the reduced form estimate in the productivity equation (i.e., the
rst stage of 2SLS). For a discussion, see for example, Angrist and Pischke (2009).
32While the households may also draw labor out of nonfarm activities and into own farming in response
to an agricultural productivity shock, our results show that the bulk of the reallocation happens within
the agricultural activities{ between own farming and hired labor (see columns 2 and 3 in Table 3).
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panel data set from Bangladesh. The focus is on the response of agricultural wages, and
labor allocation between home production and agriculture (own farming and hired labor),
and their implications for poverty measured in terms of per capita household consumption.
Following Chernozhukov and Hansen (2008), we use a two-step empirical approach that
relies on the reduced form regressions of rainfall on the measure of productivity (rice yield
per acre) and on the set of outcome variables (wages, hired labor, total hours devoted to
market activities, and household per capita consumption). The advantage of this approach
is that we can test the theoretical predictions without imposing any exclusion restrictions
on rainfall required in an instrumental variables approach.
The evidence from the reduced form regressions shows that a higher rainfall shock
increases agricultural wages signicantly, but reduces the amount of hired labor in agricul-
ture. The evidence cannot be explained in a traditional model of the rural economy with no
heterogeneity in labor supply responses of the households, although the households dier in
land and labor endowments. Using a simple model where the households vary in their labor
supply response to wage, because of the dierences in the technology of home production,
we show that the amount of hired labor can decrease after a positive productivity shock in
agriculture. This happens when the labor supply curve is atter (more elastic) for a labor-
decit household (net buyer) compared with that of a labor surplus (net seller) household.
The existence of home production is only a necessary, but not sucient, condition for ex-
plaining the negative response of hired labor to a productivity increase; it also requires
heterogeneity in the marginal returns to labor in home production, and consequently in
the labor supply.
The estimates of the eects on total labor supply to market activities show a statistically
signicant and numerically substantial positive impact of rainfall shocks. This evidence fa-
vors an explanation of the negative response of hired labor based on heterogeneity in home
production over alternative explanations based on nonfarm production or heterogeneity in
farming technology. The empirical evidence also indicates that a positive rainfall shock
increases per capita consumption signicantly, thus implying that the agricultural pro-
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ductivity increase played an important role in poverty reduction achieved in the last two
decades in rural Bangladesh (World Bank, 2013). We also provide point estimates of the
causal eect of an increase in crop yield (rice) on the outcome variables, by imposing the
exclusion restriction on rainfall in the outcomes regressions. The IV estimates suggest that
a 1 percent increase in crop yield increases agricultural wages by about 1 percent, reduces
the share of hired labor by more than 1 percent, and increases per capita expenditure by
0.50 percent.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
The market clearing condition in equation (10) in the text can be used to derive the
following result:
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The rst part of proposition (1) follows from the fact that the denominator in equation
(15) is positive as long as i < 1. The second part derives from the fact that the denominator
is a positive function of the supply response of households for market work to wage change
(captured by Lwh + L
w
k ).
Proof of Proposition 2
The response of hired labor by household k with respect to an increase in productivity
 is derived as follows:
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The rst term in the right hand side of equation (16) above is the direct productivity
eect that increases demand for labor in agriculture, and the last term combines the general
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equilibrium eects through higher wages on the demand for labor in both home production
and agricultural production.
Substituting for

@w
@

from equation (15) above into the equation for
dlw
d
(i.e., equa-
tion (16)) and rearranging terms we get the following:
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Now note that
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1
w
24 1
1  h
 
h
^
w
!(1 h) 1
 

1
1  k
 
k
^
w
!(1 k) 135
The proof then follows from the fact that Lwh   Lwk > 0 if h > k and Lwh   Lwk < 0 if
h < k.
Proof of Proposition 3
The net income of each household is the sum of land and labor income from market
activities. The total net income of the two households is thus:
Y = 2
1
41f 1
w
g 1 
Where 41 = A[1   ] 1  and Y is the total village income. The change in village
income in response to an agricultural productivity shock can be derived as:
dY
d
=
@Y
@
+
@Y
@w
@w
@
Substituting from equation (15) for @w

@
and rearranging terms, we have the following:
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It is easy to check from equation (17) above, the increase in income is higher when the
labor supply responses of the households are higher.
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 Table 1: Summary Statistics 
 2000  2005  2010  
  Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Share of Employment in        
Self-farming 26.9% 18.2% 23.9% 17.0% 25.7% 17.5% 
Agricultural Daily Labor 19.4% 16.5% 15.9% 14.0% 15.5% 13.2% 
Self-Non-agriculture 19.9% 13.8% 22.9% 14.2% 20.9% 12.3% 
Per Capita Real consumption (Taka) 812.51 349.96 889.83 317.14 1142.57 360.35 
Agricultural Wage (taka) 66.90 49.16 56.70 24.01 158.05 68.25 
Rice Yield (ton/acre) 0.95 0.11 1.01 0.13 1.35 0.46 
Population in 1991 314630 148304 297031 147249 295322 144862 
Proportion Urban 0.24 0.30 0.23 0.00 0.20 0.22 
Proportion of household with electricity 0.32 0.32 0.40 0.31 0.51 0.31 
Percent with irrigation 61.47 29.97 59.79 31.39 67.20 23.79 
Proportion of workers with secondary or above education 0.14 0.08 0.14 0.07 0.15 0.07 
Rainfall (mm) 1390.9 423.4 1635.8 382.2 1457.2 361.6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Rice Yields, Irrigation and Rainfall 
  Log(Rice Yield) % of Area 
   Irrigated 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Log(Rainfall) 0.376*** 0.493*** 24.17** 
 (6.382) (9.098) (2.118) 
Travel time to nearest large city  0.0005*** 0.0199*** 
  (10.80) (3.672) 
Proportion of households with electricity  0.00718 8.296 
  (0.269) (1.616) 
Share of urban population  -0.130* 4.502 
  (-1.854) (0.420) 
Log(Population)  0.00754 0.237 
  (0.368) (0.0796) 
Proportion with secondary or above 
education  1.291** -212.4** 
  (1.970) (-2.492) 
Log(population91)*trend  -0.0108 1.551 
  (-0.728) (0.710) 
Floodplain*trend  0.00360 -3.066 
    (0.256) (-1.296) 
Year  and Upazila Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.509 0.623 0.084 
Number of Upazilas 355 355 355 
Standard errors are clustered at upazila level. Robust t-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 Table 3: Agricultural Productivity, Rainfall, Wages, Employment and Poverty 
 
Log(agricultural 
wage) 
Employment in 
Agriculture 
Log (per 
capita 
Log (per 
capita 
Log (per 
capita 
   
Hired 
Labor 
Own-
farming 
hours 
worked) consumption) 
consumption 
of the poor) 
Log(Rainfall) 0.458*** -0.124** 0.175*** 0.209** 0.252** 0.265*** 
 (3.108) (-2.373) (3.510) (2.442) (2.503) (2.973) 
Travel time to nearest large city -8.66e-05 -2.67e-05 2.23e-05 -0.000104** 0.000139** 8.76e-05 
 (-1.150) (-0.751) (0.747) (-2.278) (2.199) (1.535) 
Proportion of households with electricity 0.0903 -0.180*** -0.0881** 0.196*** 0.390*** 0.300*** 
 (1.258) (-6.647) (-2.623) (4.952) (9.137) (7.918) 
Share of urban population 0.118 -0.00654 -0.0285 -0.0264 -0.0737 -0.0871 
 (0.659) (-0.158) (-0.596) (-0.381) (-0.828) (-1.002) 
Log(Population) 0.156*** 0.00429 0.0260* 0.0544** 0.0479* 0.0393 
 (3.102) (0.328) (1.902) (2.183) (1.771) (1.644) 
Proportion with secondary or above 
education -1.643 0.263 -0.440 -0.343 0.749 0.368 
 (-1.019) (0.640) (-0.811) (-0.454) (0.788) (0.462) 
Log(population91)*trend -0.0182 0.0259** -0.0399*** 0.00737 0.00298 0.0113 
 (-0.658) (2.210) (-3.570) (0.434) (0.152) (0.633) 
Floodplain*trend 0.0362 0.00669 -0.0104 -0.0245 -0.0652*** -0.0611*** 
  (1.294) (0.516) (-0.860) (-1.110) (-2.992) (-3.127) 
Year  and Upazila Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.814 0.150 0.094 0.175 0.507 0.570 
Number of Upazilas 341 355 355 355 355 355 
Standard errors are clustered at upazila level. Robust t-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 Table 4: Robustness Checks: Estimates from Predominantly Rural Sample (less than 50 percent population in urban municipalities) 
 
Log(agricultural 
wage) 
Employment in 
Agriculture 
Log (per 
capita hours 
Log (per 
capita 
Log (per 
capita 
   
Hired 
Labor 
Own-
farming  worked) consumption) 
consumption 
of the poor) 
Log(Rainfall) 0.397*** -0.115** 0.209*** 0.239** 0.296*** 0.329*** 
  (2.684) (-1.974) (3.502) (2.472) (2.923) (3.828) 
Year  and Upazila Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Full set of controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.819 0.156 0.091 0.189 0.522 0.589 
Number of Upazilas 316 320 320 320 320 320 
Standard errors are clustered at upazila level. Robust t-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Figure 1: Equilibrium in the Hired Labor Market: Impacts of an outward shift in Labor 
Demand, Symmetric Labor Supply Response Case 
LD’k= LD’h 
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Figure 2: Equilibrium in the Hired Labor Market: Impacts of an outward shift in 
Labor Demand, Asymmetric Labor Supply Response Case 
LD’k= LD’h 
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Online Appendix to the Theoretical Model
(1) The Concept of Home Production
The concept of home production we use is essentially that of Becker (1965)
and consists of services that are primarily produced and consumed within the
household. The archetypal home production include food (meal preparation),
children, and housing (Becker (1965), Heckman (2015), Fontana andWood(2000)).
The home goods are neither \food" nor \cash crops" in the sense of de Janvry
et al (1991). They dene cash crops as crops that are not consumed by the
household, and produced solely for the market. In Bangladesh context, only
tea crops can be called cash crops, even jute is not a cash crop according to
their denition, as households consume part of it, even though most of it is
sold. Tea is not produced by farmers, and the importance of jute production
has gone down steadily in last 35 years. The households usually produce rice
or vegetables to sell in the market, which we subsume under food crop. Also
note that in our model, there is only one crop (rice) which is a food staple. But
it is not appropriate to call it a subsistence crop, because the rice market is
very well-developed. The subsistence farming in this case can be thought of as
only those households that do not participate in the market as they fall in the
transaction cost band (household specic missing market a la de Janvry et al
(1991). But such cases are likely to be a very small proportion, because most
of the households in rural Bangladesh participate in the market (either as a net
seller or buyer). The home production in our model is nontraded.
(2) Implications of Heterogeneity in Land Endowments
For the sake of simplicity and given the focus on labor market, the model
developed in the paper focuses on the heterogeneity in labor endowments, and
assume that the land endowment to be same across households. Given the
constant returns technology in the production of food, what is needed for hired
labor market to exist in our model is heterogeneity in labor to land ratio. In
other words, the main results remain intact under the alternative assumption
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that the labor endowments of households are the same but their endowments
of land dier. In particular, we would assume that household k has more land
than household h. This is equivalent to the assumption that household k is
relatively labor decit and household h labor surplus. The rest of the analysis
will then remain the same as described in the main text.
An interesting case is where some households are functionally landless (land-
holding too small) as is common in rural Bangladesh. To take an extreme exam-
ple, suppose household h owns no land. An increase in labor demand and hence
wages in response to a positive agricultural productivity shock will increase la-
bor supply of household h. In this case, we cannot have an equilibrium where
hired labor decreases and wages increase in response to a positive agricultural
productivity shock. This case is, however, equivalent to the assumption that
h > k in our model. Our model is thus more general in the sense that it is able
to identify conditions under which one can observe dierent responses of hired
labor (increase, decrease or no change) in response to agricultural productivity
changes.
(A.6) Implications of Nonfarm Production in the Village
Since our empirical analysis focuses on the labor allocation within the farm-
ing sector (between self employment and hired labor), the theoretical model ab-
stracts away from nonfarm production in the village. We also assume that the
nonfarm good consumed by the households is imported from the outside of the
village at a parametric price, which allows us to abstract from the demand side
inuences. While developing a model with nonfarm activities under dierent
technologies and dierent trading statuses is beyond the scope of this paper,
we can draw useful intuitions from the existing models on this topic.1 First,
consider the case where the non-farm activity is non-traded and produced under
decreasing returns to scale (DRS) technology. Then this activity looks just like
the home goods sector in our model. An increase in the agricultural productiv-
ity will lead to a decrease in employment in non-farm activities in the village, in
this case. How the increase in employment in agriculture is distributed between
1A more detailed model is developed in Emran and Shilpi (2014).
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hired labor and self-employment will be determined again by the dierences in
the technology of home production between households. Second, consider the
other extreme example, where the non-farm activity is traded, and the demand
linkage is no longer in play. As shown in Foster and Rosenzweig (2004), the
increase in the rural wage implies a decline in employment in nonfarm in this
case. Again, the labor share of agriculture increases, and its reallocation be-
tween self employment and hired labor is determined by technologies in home
production. In the intermediate case, where the nonfarm good is non-traded
and produced under constant returns, employment in agriculture and nonfarm
changes proportionately (Foster and Rosenzweig, 2004). Finally, in addition to
being non-traded and produced under constant returns, if the income elasticity
of nonfarm good is very high (more than 1) and that of food low, the labor allo-
cation to non-farm may increase in response to agricultural productivity growth
(Emran and Shilpi, 2014). To see this in a simple setting, consider the polar case,
where the income elasticity of demand is such that all additional income from
agricultural productivity gains is spent on nontraded non-agricultural services.
This assumption maximizes the impact of agricultural productivity on nonfarm
services. Also, assume that there is no impact on the demand for labor in agri-
culture (which is similar to the assumption that the production function in agri-
culture is Leontief, an extreme assumption nonetheless. Under these extreme
assumptions, one can nd labor to reallocate from farming to non-farm. Yet,
without introducing some types of heterogeneity in the labor supply responses,
one cannot explain the reallocation of hired vs. self-employment within the
farming sector. Even when these extreme assumptions are valid, one should
observe a decline in share of labor employed in agriculture. It aects only the
labor reallocation between farm and non-farm, not necessarily between the hired
labor and self employment in agriculture. As we see from the dierent scenarios
discussed above, household level heterogeneity in the production of home goods
and endowment of resources (labor relative to land) are essential for generating
implications of agricultural productivity change for reallocation of labor within
the agricultural sector.
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